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ABSTRACT:  Shadow banking in developing and emerging countries (DECs) 
oscillates between two semantic poles. One definition is typically deployed by 
scholars for the narrow analysis of non-bank financial intermediation as viable 
alternative to banking. The other, more recent, circulates in the policy world to 
capture a new agenda of engineering (securities) market-based finance. The second, 
the paper argues, is the essential but neglected aspect of DECs shadow banking. The 
‘shadow banking into market-based finance’ narrative reaffirms the celebratory tone 
of the financial globalization cum liberalization thesis dominant before the global 
financial crisis. It seeks to depoliticize contentious debates about capital flows and the 
constraints that globalized finance poses to development, instead asking DECs to 
abandon capital controls, encourage portfolio flows, relax the regulatory grip on 
shadow funding markets and tap into the growing global demand for securities that 
marks the new age of asset management.  
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Introduction 
 
 
‘in order to successfully internationalise the RMB […] China will have to build deep 
and liquid financial markets open to the rest of the world’ (Eichengreen 2015 p1). 
 
the real issue isn’t the volume of debt, but rather the liability-side 
plumbing that underlines the debt boom…if there is going to be a 
financial crisis in China, this is where it will come from’.  
            Financial Times (2016) 
 
The term shadow banking has had a short yet unusually productive life. It was first 
coined in 2007 to account for the workings of complex chains of credit, liquidity and 
leverage with no systemic regulatory oversight (Ban and Gabor 2017). By 2011, the 
G20 countries had thrown their weight behind it, mandating a newly created 
international institution (the Financial Stability Board) to map its systemic risks. The 
FSB published the first annual global monitoring exercise in 2011, and by 2015 an 
annual progress report monitoring the implementation of its reforms. If the political 
power of economic ideas is demonstrated by the speed with which they trigger 
institutional change (Blyth 2002, Ban 2016, Helgadottir 2016), then shadow banking 
is an exceptionally powerful idea.  
 
What does the rise of this powerful idea mean for developing and emerging countries? 
At first, it seemed very little. The first FSB (2011) policy documents drew heavily on 
the literature offering a structural change account of the global financial crisis (Adrian 
and Shin 2009, 2010a, Gorton and Metrick 2012 and Pozsar et al 2010). According to 
these seminal papers, the liberalisation spur of the 1980s saw banks and capital 
markets in high-income countries become closely connected in a globalised finance 
built around securities markets (also Mehrling 2012, see Christophers 2013 for a 
critical account). Shadow banking captured the production (via securitization of 
illiquid bank loans) and funding (via wholesale markets) of tradable securities, or as 
Mehrling et al (2013) put it ‘money market funding of capital market lending’. Its 
distinctive vulnerabilities arose from the use of newly created asset and mortgage-
backed securities as collateral to tap wholesale market funding, where complex 
collateral valuation practices triggered runs during crisis (see Brunnermeier and 
Pedersen 2009, Gabor 2016). To regulate shadow banking, the FSB (2011) insisted, it 
was necessary to regulate banks’ activities in the shadows -  securitization, collateral-
based wholesale funding  - and a new breed of (shadow) banks, money market funds.  
 
On these terms, few developing countries had any shadow banking to speak of. In 
most, capital markets mainly consisted of government bond markets, while banks lent 
to each other without collateral. Indeed, the FSB’s first global monitoring exercise 
had only one (arguably) ‘emerging’ country, South Korea. This changed quickly. By 
2013, Mark Carney, the head of the FSB, warned that shadow banking in emerging 
countries posed serious risks to global financial stability, and called for reforms of the 
‘parallel banking sector in the big developing countries’. Most interpreted his remarks 
to mean China. With this, the FSB elevated DEC shadow banking on equal footing in 
terms of relevance to global financial stability. 
 
Since then, the literature on DEC shadow banking has been mostly concerned with 
establishing whether this is a ‘viable credit alternative’ to the formal banking sector 
(Allen et al 2016, Tsai 2016, Acharya et al 2013). It defines shadow banking as ‘other 
financial intermediaries’ that meet the needs of economic actors traditionally left out 
by banks, such as SMEs (Acharya et al 2013, Schwarcz 2016, Allen et al 2016). Yet 
DEC regulators worry that this approach conflates well-regulated non-bank financial 
institutions important to economic development with shadow banks posing systems 
risks (FSB 2014). If the FSB’s shadow banking agenda was to become an important 
input into regulating domestic financial systems, then DEC countries insisted that 
‘each jurisdiction has the flexibility to exercise national discretion’ in designing 
regulatory regimes proportional to the risks posed by shadow banking entities (FSB 
2014: 57).   
 
The ‘viable alternative’ literature, this paper argues, suffers from two important 
shortcomings. First, it depicts DEC shadow banking as a universe strictly confined by 
national borders. This is immediately apparent from the growing literature on shadow 
banking in China, usually portrayed as the escape valve of a financial system 
repressed by the long hand of the state. Second, it ignores the changing ambitions of 
the global regulatory community as expressed by the FSB work on shadow banking. 
Since 2014, the FSB agenda changed from a regulatory intervention motivated by the 
rise of new systemic actors and markets to a deeply normative project of transforming 
shadow banking into resilient ‘market-based finance’ that organizes financial systems 
around securities markets (FSB 2015, 2016, also Engelen 2017).  
 
Such transformative ambitions matter for development. Market-based finance has 
evolved from Gerschenkron (1962) into what many describe as ‘the age of asset 
management’ (Haldane 2014, Braun 2015). Securities markets are no longer driven by 
the needs of economic development and industrialization a la Gerschenkron, but the 
demand for securities generated by powerful institutional investors such as pension 
funds, insurance companies and multinational corporations with large cash reserves. 
The rise of asset managers is a manifestation of the growing inability of high-income 
countries to tax powerful corporations and collectively provision for future 
uncertainties (Streeck 2014, Gabor 2016, Helgadotir 2016), prompting individuals to 
turn to the market via private insurance and pension funds in a new regime of asset-
based welfare (Finlayson 2009). The same pressures manifest in DEC countries, 
advised by international development organizations to adopt market solutions (such as 
the privatization of public pension funds), and encourage the entry of foreign 
investors into local currency debt markets. Indeed, asset managers have absorbed a 
growing share of the rapidly expanding DEC local currency securities since 2008 
(Farolli et al 2014). Foreign holdings of DEC local currency bonds doubled from 
12.7% in 2008 to 30.1% in 2015, as DEC local currency debt increased fourfold to 
$17.2 trillion in that period  (IMF and World Bank 2016). 
 
Thus, the new shadow banking agenda seeks to define the terms on which DEC 
countries join the global supply of securities, re-invigorating a pre-crisis plan pursued 
by G8 countries, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to accelerate 
the reach of financial globalization (G8 2007). This policy-engineered financial 
globalisation seeks a clean break from ‘policy-engineered industrialisation’ in DEC 
countries that involved capital controls, bank credit guided by the priorities of 
industrial strategies and competitive exchange rate management (Storm 2017). It 
seeks to accelerate the global diffusion of the architecture of the US securities and 
securities funding markets, with its well-documented fragilities (FSB 2012, 2013, 
Tarullo 2015, Gabor 2016) and contested social efficiency (see Epstein this issue), in 
order to support business models predicated on daily volatility in the market price of 
securities.  
 
This is important for broader questions of development and economic stability in 
DEC countries, historically more vulnerable to volatile capital flows (Dutt 2013, Rey 
2014). In the wake of the global financial crisis, for the first time since the 
Washington Consensus, DEC countries successfully questioned the purported benefits 
of free capital flows and normalized the use of capital controls to deal with ‘currency 
wars’ ignited by large central banks. The project to transform shadow banking, the 
paper argues using China as a case study, threatens DEC’s new ‘monetary power’ 
(Gallagher 2014), a hard-fought victory to deal with the dilemmas posed by global 
financial cycles (Rey 2014, Gabor 2015, Kaltenbrunner and Painceira 2017) and 
financialisation more broadly (Bortz and Kaltenbrunner this issue). On the longer–
term, the turn to market-based finance prepares the terrain for organizing 
development interventions via securities markets, as suggested by the growing 
popularity of green bonds, social impact bonds and digital financial inclusion 
approaches to poverty reduction (Gabor and Brooks 2016, Mader this issue). 
 
DEC shadow banking as ‘viable credit alternative’ 
 
The early literature on DEC shadow banking noted an important challenge. 
Conceptually, shadow banking had emerged to capture new processes that 
‘decompose the process of credit intermediation into a sequence of discrete credit 
operations’ (Ghosh et al 2012) through opaque chains of bank and non-bank 
companies (Pozsar et al 2010). The chains were connected through two important 
shadow activities: the production (via securitization markets) and financing (via 
wholesale funding markets) of tradable securities (FSB 2011).  
 
The production and financing of tradable securities reflected structural changes in 
financial markets of high-income countries. Relationship banking made way for 
broadly two types of non-bank investors populating the universe of asset managers: 
those hungry for higher returns (via leverage) and those demanding safety. Shadow 
banking connected the two. The first, driven by the ‘imperative to generate assets to 
fill balance sheets’ (Adrian and Shin 2009), could fund securities portfolios by 
pledging them as collateral in repo funding markets to institutional cash pools. These 
– multinational companies, insurance companies, money market and pension funds – 
demanded safe vehicles for their cash that traditional banking provided to retail bank 
depositors under deposit guarantees and lender of last resort support from central 
banks (Pozsar 2011, IMF 2014). Large banks with activities in securities markets 
would sit in between, moving idle funds and collateral between institutional cash 
pools and leveraged funds (Pozsar 2011, Gabor 2016). The presence of collateral 
created the (perception of) safety that institutional cash pools required to lend to 
leveraged investors via bank balance sheets (Pozsar 2011, 2014, Singh 2011).   
 
Collateral-intensive relationships, the early literature argued, made financial systems 
built around securities markets more fragile (Adrian and Shin 2010a,b). In drawing 
attention to the fragility of collateral, the shadow banking literature resurrected a 
prescient insight from Hyman Minsky:  
 
…the viability of loans mainly made because of collateral, however, 
depends upon the expected market value of the assets that are pledged 
[…]An emphasis by bankers on the collateral value and the expected 
values of assets is conducive to the emergence of a fragile financial 
structure. (Minsky 1986, 233) 
 
Without explicitly referencing Minsky, the early shadow banking literature echoed his 
observation. It connected financial instability to the collateral valuation mechanism 
deployed in securities financing (known as repo) transactions (Adrian and Shin 
2010b). In a repo contract, a bank buys securities from a hedge fund, which in turn 
promises to repurchase them at a later point in time. For the hedge fund, the repo 
(repurchase) agreement is a mechanism for funding securities, by borrowing from the 
bank using those securities as collateral. For the duration of the repo contract, the 
hedge fund and the bank calculate the market value of collateral on a daily basis 
(marking it to market), with the purpose of maintaining the market value of collateral 
equal to the cash lent. If collateral increases in price, the bank is obliged to send the 
hedge fund the difference, either in cash or in securities. The bank has two incentives 
in the repo transaction: it charges an interest rate on the cash it has loaned to the 
hedge fund and it also becomes legal owner of the collateral securities (although it is 
obliged to send interest payments on those securities to the economic owner, the 
hedge fund). Collateral ownership allows it to repo those securities for its market-
making activities, making profit from the spread between the purchase and the sale 
price (the bid-ask spread) (CGFS 2017). The profitability of the hedge fund and of the 
market-making bank depends on daily variation in the price of securities (Lindo 
2013).  
 
This emphasis on collateral value lies at the heart of shadow banking fragility. During 
good times, daily increases in securities prices free up balance sheet space, 
encouraging the hedge fund to take further leverage (Adrian and Shin 2010b). In bad 
times, falling securities’ prices trigger runs as the hedge fund needs to find additional 
collateral, and when it cannot, it resorts to firesales that push asset prices lower 
(Gorton and Metrick 2009, FSB 2012, 2013). It was the destabilizing potential of 
daily collateral valuation that prompted the Financial Stability Board to dedicate the 
repo work-stream on shadow banking to collateral fragility, imperative to “reduce the 
cycle of excessive borrowing in economic booms that cannot be sustained when 
liquidity dissipates in core fixed-income markets” (Carney, 2014).  
 
The literature on DEC shadow banking found little of such structural phenomena built 
around tradable securities. Shadow banking, one paper argued, ‘does not involve long, 
complex, opaque chains of intermediation, as is often the case in advanced 
economies’ (Ghosh et al 2012). Finding little evidence of complex, collateral-
intensive financial engineering, scholars equated shadow banking with non-bank 
financial institutions (NBFIs) and reframed the analytical questions from ‘how did we 
get to this new financial landscape fragile in novel ways’ to ‘is shadow banking a 
viable alternative to traditional banking in emerging countries?’. 
 
This, it turned out, would be a question mainly asked of China. In one of the few 
exceptions, Acharya et al (2013) examine India. Shadow banking, they argue, 
provides a ‘completeness of credit spectrum in the economy’ because it can reach 
borrowers (SMEs, rural areas, infrastructure developers) that traditional banks cannot 
or will not service. Yet the authors caution that equating shadow banking with NBFI 
is misleading in that the Indian regulators first developed a complex prudential regime 
for deposit-taking NBFIs, and the capital requirements for systemic non-deposit 
NBFIs in 2006. RBI defined ‘systemic’ NBFIs as those with assets above 1bn rupees, 
together amounting to roughly 10.5% of bank assets in 20111 and 14% in 2015.  The 
authors dismiss the idea that NBFIs are Lehman-type shadow banks, systemic nodes 
in complex collateralised networks, since ‘none of these NBFC may be large enough 
on their own to cause systemic collapse’. The danger, if any, arises from traditional 
bank lending to NBFIs, but not opaque financial engineering of tradable securities.  
 
In turn, the literature on shadow banking in China documents in great detail the 
(admittedly eye-watering) growth in ‘shadow’ credit creation since 2010. It identifies 
three broad drivers: financial repression, the fiscal-monetary policy mix and the 
distinctive politics of local-central government relationships.  
 
The China literature turns the US story on its head. Whereas US shadow banking 
emerged from competitive pressures pushing banks into the shadow, encouraged by 
light-tough regulation, China’s shadow banking is a market-response to financial 
repression (Zhang 2013). The network of trust companies, brokerage firms, small 
lenders and financial guarantors grew rapidly in response to the Chinese state’s 
intervention in loan and deposit markets (for example with caps on deposit rates for 
regulated banks), directed credit policies (regulators discouraging lending to sectors 
such as real estate), costly reserve requirements and prohibitive loan-to-deposit ratio 
(see Elliot et al, 2015). Banks were key nodes in these shadow networks, seeking to 
boost profits and circumvent tight credit conditions (Awrey 2014, Elliot et al 2015, 
Dang, Wang and Yao 2015). The most illustrative example is the rapid growth in 
Wealth Management Products, off-balance sheet funding instruments. Small and 
medium banks structured WMPs to ward off competition for retail deposits from big 
banks, whereas the latter use WMPs to refinance their local government loans 
(Acharya et al 2016)2.   
 
Some ‘shadow’ products – such as entrusted loans extended by cash-rich corporations 
to other corporations via banks – provide important sources of alternative financing, a 
market solution to credit shortage (Allen et al 2016). Often, big non-financial 
corporates tap subsidized bank credit and re-lend it to the private sector (Du, Li and 
Wang 2016). In sum, shadow banking steps into the void created by the long-hand of 
the state, extending credit to SMEs and other private firms neglected by the Chinese 
developmental strategy (Sheng et al 2015, Ellio and Qiao 2015).  
 
The significant fiscal stimulus of 2009/10 (approximately 12% of GDP) cast a long 
‘shadow’ in two ways. One involves the Chinese central bank (the PBOC) tightening 
the monetary policy stance to contain the inflationary potential of the fiscal 																																																								1	The total assets of ‘systemic’ NBFIs rose from 2.5 trillion rupee in 2006 (around 9% of bank assets) 
to around 7.3 trillion rupee in 2011, (around 10.3% of bank assets).	2	Trust companies, insurance companies, brokerage firms and private equity funds not related to banks 
also issue Wealth Management Products. 	
expansion. Since the Big Four banks dealt with the burden of supporting the Stimulus 
Plan by aggressively bidding for deposits and shadow financing (via WMPs) in an 
environment of tighter liquidity, smaller banks were forced into the shadows 
(Acharya et al 2016). The other saw the central government use local governments’ 
access to shadow credit as quasi-fiscal lever. Beijing allowed local governments to 
fund social services and ambitious infrastructure projects via shadow banking, by 
creating Local Government Financing Vehicles (Bai, Hsieh and Song 2016).  These 
were set up as companies that could issue bonds and borrow from banks, 
circumventing rules a ban on direct local borrowing in place since 1994. This marks 
the distinctiveness of Chinese shadow banking, benefiting in most parts from implicit 
state guarantees.  
 
The China literature has little to say about systemic risks of the shadow banking kind, 
beyond the obvious warning that banks’ involvement in rapid credit growth may end 
up in a financial crisis. Shadow banking in China is opaque but not complex (Sharma 
2014). Rather than built around tradable debt, it involves ‘non-standard debt 
instruments’ that are rarely if ever traded (Liao, Sun and Zhang 2016). It generates 
perverse incentives for front-running ‘gradual’ policy approaches (Brunnermeier et al 
2017), but when the day of reckoning comes, it will be the state-owned banks and the 
state that will have to pay for it. China’s shadow banking may pose a threat to the 
global economy, it is argued, but not the Lehman-type ripples propagating through 
wholesale funding chains.  
 
This is a critical omission. Busy condemning financial repression (and implicitly the 
developmental state3), scholars have both underestimated China’s willingness to 
tighten regulations and neglected the broader political economy of reminibi 
internationalisation driving a new approach to shadow banking. Indeed, events since 
2014 suggest that we should not read Chinese shadow banking as an elaborate artifice 
of regulatory arbitrage, but rather as a shifting policy experiment with liberalizing the 
financial sector (He and Wang 2012) by encouraging securities markets. This has led 
to a rapid change in structure and complexity that increasingly fits the picture of pre-
crisis US shadow banking.  
 
China – a case study of transitioning to market-based finance  
 
In 2014, China announced a series of reforms intended to put a break on shadow 
credit to real economy. It removed the ceiling on bank deposit rates, the binding loan-
to-deposit ratio, and tightened rules on banks’ involvement with entrusted loans, trust 
beneficiary rights, directional asset management plans and wealth management 
products4 (Chen et al. 2016, also Keohane 20165). While analysts remain divided on 
the overall tightening impact, the widely used proxy for shadow credit to the real 
economy, non-bank credit in ‘Total Social Financing’ (including trust loans, entrusted 
																																																								
3 See Michell (2012) for an account of the role of the financial system in China’s high growth rate 
performance.	
4 Since January 2017, banks cannot issue WMP off balance sheet, while the on-balance sheet holdings 
are targeted by the new macroprudential framework. The policy pressures for deleveraging saw WMP 
issuance fall by around 10% between by June 2017.		 	
5 https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2016/06/08/2165445/document-82-and-slapping-down-chinas-shadow-
loan-market/ 
loans and bankers’ acceptance bills) fell from 30% of total credit extended to 
nonfinancial corporates in 2013 to around 5% by end of 2016 (see Li 2016). 
 
Arguably more important than the clampdown on regulatory loopholes, China 
introduced measures to reorganize shadow banking into securities markets. The share 
of capital raised by firms in securities markets increased from 12% of TSF in 2010 to 
30% in 2016. One key policy was to move local governments from shadows into 
securities markets. The central government would allow local authorities to issue 
municipal bonds and create the legal framework for switching (short-term, high 
interest) LGFV debt into municipal bonds. With this, China aimed to transform a 
symbol of ballooning leverage, equivalent in 2014 to 38% of GDP, into market-based 
finance, and replace the implicit guarantees with the principle of ‘self-issue, self 
replacement’.  
 
As a result, the local government bond segment expanded from less than a RMB 1 
trillion in 2014 to around RMN 12 trillion by March 2017, the fastest growing 
securities market (Figure 1). With it, the Chinese securities markets became the third 
largest in the world, behind US and Japan. Commercial banks own the largest share of 
securities, directly and via WMPs. It is important to note the growing share of 
institutional investors, with mutual funds, insurance and securities companies 
collectively holding around 23% of outstanding securities (Figure 2).  
 
 
Figure	1	Growth	in	securities	markets,	China,	2014-
2017	(	RMB	trillion)	
 
Figure	 2	 Ownership	 of	 Chinese	 securities,	
June	2017	
 
 
 
China is not alone in experiencing a rapid growth in local institutional investment. In 
2014, DEC pension funds and insurance companies held assets of USD 6 trillion 
(World Bank and IMF, 2016). By mid-2016, India’s asset management industry 
reached USD 1 trillion, compared to USD 8.5 trillion in China. This reflects the 
growing cash reserves of DEC corporations, rising inequality and market-based 
provisions for health (insurance) and pensions.  
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Historically, the provision of credit via securities markets has been accompanied by 
rapid growth in wholesale money markets where securities are financed (Lindo 2013, 
Gabor and Vestergaard 2016). This has also been the case in China. Its repo market 
reached USD 8 trillion by June 2017 (RMB 50 trillion), similar in volume to 
European and US repo markets (see Figure 3). To put this in perspective, in 2010 it 
was a fifth of those markets. In that period, Chinese banks and shadow banks 
increased their repo funding from 10% to 30% of total funding (IMF 2016).  
 
The Chinese repo market has two distinctive segments: the interbank repo and the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) repo (see Lee and Kendall 2017). The former, an 
over-the-counter market, dwarfs the latter in size. The term ‘interbank’ is a misnomer 
in that market participants include institutional investors alongside banks. Most 
interbank repos are pledged (see Figure 3). The Chinese central bank (PBOC) is an 
active participant in the pledged market, which it uses to inject liquidity into the 
financial system and support credit extension via securities markets. Together with 
large policy banks, it provides around 80% of pledged repo funding to smaller 
(country and cooperative) banks and a growing array of local institutional investors. 
In the outright segment, commercial banks fund securities companies.  
 
The difference between pledged and outright repos resides in the legal status of 
collateral. To illustrate, a securities companies funding corporate bonds on the 
outright segment would sell those bonds to a commercial bank, and promise to 
repurchase them later point in time, overnight or longer. The commercial bank 
becomes legal owner of collateral (the corporate bonds) for the duration of the repo, 
and can re-use it for market-making activities or for short-selling. If the commercial 
bank accepts the corporate bond as collateral in a pledged repo, it only becomes legal 
owner if the securities company defaults. A pledged repo does not enable re-use of 
collateral, and therefore market-making activities for banks (and other financial 
institutions). Put differently, only the outright segment of the Chinese repo market fits 
the legal definition of a repo that guides the FSB shadow banking regulatory 
framework.   
 
Figure	 3	 The	 interbank	 repo	market,	 China,	 2001-
2017	
 
 
Source: ChinaBond.com and WIND 
Figure	4	The	outright	repo	market,	China,	2007-
2017	(June)	
 
 
 
The shift to market-based finance documented above is not simply a project of 
cleaning up shadow banking. Rather, it should be viewed through the lens of the 
RMB internationalization strategy, designed to attract foreign investors to China’s 
securities markets. Indeed, pointing to the low share of foreign ownership of Chinese 
securities, scholars and the international policy community have consistently argued 
that ‘in order to successfully internationalise the RMB, in the sense of enhancing its 
attractiveness as an international unit of account, means of payment and store of 
value, China will have to build deep and liquid financial markets open to the rest of 
the world’ (Eichengreen 2015 p1, also Mersch 2014, Helleiner and Kirchner 2014). 
Deep, liquid markets would attract foreign investors that prefer to hold foreign assets 
in liquid securities.  
 
While tightening controls of residents’ attempts to move capital abroad, China has 
cautiously welcomed foreign portfolio investors. In February 2016, it extended the list 
of foreign institutions that can enter securities markets without approval or quota 
limits to include commercial banks, asset managers and institutional investors.  In 
July 2017, it introduced the Bond Connect that allows foreign investors to trade 
Chinese bonds in Hong Kong. Market analysts expected this to generate around RMB 
1 trillion of inflows in the second half of 2017 (Bloomberg 2017).  
 
Critical for understanding the metamorphosis of shadow banking into market-based 
finance, China continued to grant access to shadow funding (repo) markets to only a 
handful of foreign institutions: foreign reserve (central bank) managers and offshore 
RMB clearing banks (Deutsche Bank 2016). Its reluctance to open up the repo market 
offers an entry point to examine shadow banking as terrain for broader political 
struggles over the shape of financial globalization since the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers.  
 
 
‘The world needs to develop missing markets’: from the G8 to FSB  
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The academic literature on DEC shadow banking has stayed safe of theorizing it as 
phenomena intricately linked to financial globalization. Yet this is precisely what the 
FSB agenda has gradually evolved into, reinvigorating a pre-crisis plan initiated by 
high-income countries to actively engineer market-based finance in DEC countries. 
 
The story officially begins in May 2007, at the Potsdam meeting of the G8 Ministries 
of Finance. These announced an Action Plan for developing DEC local bond markets, 
drawn under the leadership of the German Central Bank, the Bundesbank, with 
cooperation from the World Bank and the IMF (G8 2007). The plan argued that 
deeper securities markets would reduce dependency on external financing and 
improve DEC countries’ ability to withstand volatile capital inflows, learning an 
important lesson from the East Asian crisis. While acknowledging capital flow 
volatility, the Action Plan called for carefully phasing out capital controls, eliminating 
first those capital controls that hamstrung local securities markets (such as 
withholding taxes on foreign investors’ bond earnings). Domestic institutional 
investors were also to be encouraged, by privatizing pension funds and ‘enabling 
mutual funds and insurance companies’. These will later become known in the 
shadow banking literature as ‘institutional cash pools’, the demand side driving 
shadow banking (Pozsar 2011). 
 
To demonstrate its commitment to the process, the World Bank set up Gemloc, a 
Global Fund for Emerging Markets Local Currency Bonds. This would raise USD 5 
bn in a public private partnership with PIMCO, then the world’s largest asset 
manager, to ‘transform local bond markets into a mainstream asset class’. 
‘Investability’, measuring the attractiveness for large foreign investors, would be 
further improved by a private global index, GEMX (World Bank 2007).  
 
At first, the global financial crisis seemed to deal a serious blow to this German-
driven G8 project. Brazil’s Finance Minister coined the term ‘currency war’ in 2010 
to describe what he, and other DEC policy makers, thought the US Fed 
unconventional monetary policies meant for DEC markets. The US Fed was flooding 
the developing world with cheap dollars, triggering widespread concerns that the 
‘wall of money’ surging from the West would bring back asset bubbles, currency 
overvaluation and loss of export competitiveness that afflicted DEC countries at one 
point or another throughout the Washington Consensus era, episodes that inevitably 
culminated in currency and financial crises (Gabor 2012, Kaltenbrunner and Painceira 
2017). The global financial crisis did what the East Asian, Russian, Brazilian and 
Argentinian crises failed to do, weakening the political clout of what Jagdish 
Bhagwati (1998) termed the ‘Wall Street –Treasury complex’ that successfully 
pressured DEC countries to open their capital accounts.  
 
This time, DEC countries pledged, would be different. In the regulatory community, 
the conceptual framework was shifting from the celebratory narrative of free capital 
flows to a new vocabulary of global liquidity, global financial cycles, carry-trade 
speculation, interconnectedness on the balance sheet of global banks and vulnerability 
(CGFS 2011, Rey 2014, Gabor 2015). Marking the growing ‘monetary power’ of 
DEC countries (Gallagher 2014), that year the IMF abandoned its notorious 
opposition to capital controls (Ostry et al 2010, Gabor 2012). Scholars celebrated the 
normalization of capital controls as the ‘the single most important way in which 
policy space for development has widened in several decades’ (Grabel 2011:806). 
One after another, large DEC countries imposed controls on portfolio flows, foreign 
investors entering their local securities markets (Gabor 2014).  
 
The Bundesbank and its partners were quick to find a strategic response to the 
changing politics of portfolio flows. The desirability of free flows was reaffirmed 
through a ‘missing markets’ narrative (Braasch 2012).  According to this, the global 
financial crisis showed that short-term portfolio inflows (into securities/equities 
markets) were a destabilizing factor because international investors hurried for the 
exit without paying much attention to (distinctive) fundamentals (also Dombret 2011). 
The solution, the institutions insisted, was not capital controls but more markets. 
Pushing ahead with the original plan would deepen local securities markets and 
expand the investor base to domestic institutional investors that could act as a buffer, 
increasing DEC’s capacity to absorb large capital inflows. Solving the problem of 
missing markets would also reduce global imbalances, since large DEC countries 
(read China) would no longer need to recycle their savings in US financial markets 
(including shadow banking). That year, at the Cannes Summit, the G20 endorsed an 
extended Action Plan.  
 
The revised plan stressed that capital markets is a long-term project that requires 
carefully sequenced structural measures. With this, the G20 ensured that the wording 
accommodated, albeit not explicitly, the use of capital controls by calling to expand 
‘the range of instruments available to manage volatile short-term flows’ (G20 2011). 
Buried deep within the technical appendix of this cautious approach, however, lurked 
shadow banking.  
 
The appendix described the modernisation of repo markets as immediate priority, to 
‘enhance the money and bond market nexus’. The 2013 Diagnostic Framework 
identifying the barriers to DEC securities market development provided further detail: 
‘the money market is the starting point to developing [..] fixed income (i.e. securities) 
markets’, integral to financial stability, and to the emergence of market-makers6 (IMF 
et al 2013). It recommended the introduction of global standards for repo collateral 
(known as classic repos) that protected both lenders and borrowers, but failed to 
connect the repo-building project with the FSB view of repo markets as the critical, 
fragile plumbing of the shadow banking universe.  
 
The synergies between the Local Currency Bond Market plans and the FSB agenda on 
shadow banking became apparent in 2014. That year, the FSB’s progress report 
identified a new priority, to transform shadow banking into resilient market-based 
finance (Engelen 2017). At first, this appeared to be political semantics, responding to 
DEC countries concerned that the FSB’s definition cast a pejorative tone, and 
required tightening regulations, on an alternative system of credit intermediation that 
played an important role in countries where the absence of collateral excluded 
borrowers from bank lending (FSB 2014). The 2015 FSB reports on shadow banking 
in the Americas and Asia adopted this framing, extending the definition to 
‘intermediation through non-bank or market-based channels’.  
 																																																								
6 In securities markets, market-makers, usually banks, stand ready to buy and sell, thus making a market in that 
debt instrument. 
The 2015 FSB report on China elaborated the meaning of resilient market-based 
finance further. It called on authorities to: 
  
continue to promote a more diversified and resilient financial system by 
increasing reliance on market-based pricing mechanisms via financial 
liberalisation and the removal of implicit guarantees, and by encouraging the 
development of capital markets and of an institutional investor base as an 
alternative pillar to bank financing (p.15).   	
The FSB also stressed that this approach was not unique to China. Many other DEC 
countries, it argued, ‘are in the process of improving their monitoring and developing 
appropriate policy tools to ensure that non-bank activities develop into a transparent, 
resilient and sustainable source of market-based financing’ (p22).   
 
Repo market reforms were central to the FSB (2015) recommendations on shadow 
banking reform in China. Using the language of the sister initiative, the Local 
Currency Bond Markets Action plan, it called for China to ‘upgrade the regulatory 
and operational repo market framework to increase market liquidity, enhance risk 
management and reinforce the money and bond market interest rate nexus’. The FSB 
(2016) report on India similarly outlined a long list of repo market liberalisation 
measures introduced since 20107 in the effort to create ‘vibrant secondary market 
liquidity’. Put differently, the FSB country reports intimated that it was important to 
redesign repo markets according to global standards if DECs wanted to develop local 
securities markets, thus tapping into the growing global demand.  
 
In this approach to engineering ‘resilient market-based finance’, the FSB and other 
international financial institutions are now fully aligned with the demands of the 
global asset management industry. Take ASIFMA, the Asia Securities Industry and 
Financial Markets Association, whose mission is to promote liquid and efficient 
capital markets in Asia. It produced two important policy notes, the 2013 ‘India Bond 
Market Roadmap’ and the 2017 ‘China’s capital markets: the road ahead’. Both 
reports stress that secondary market liquidity, a sine qua non of resilient securities 
markets, require the two countries to open up repo markets to foreign investors and 
replace idiosyncratic repo market architectures with ‘classic’ repos (ASIFMA 2013, 
2017).  
 
Why this seemingly innocuous demand matters for DEC countries becomes 
immediately apparent in the Chinese repo market. The lesson from Lehman, it is 
argued, is that the danger resides not in the bond markets but in their money market 
plumbing. The exponential growth has been a source of persistent concern in the 
policy world (IMF 2014, FSB 2016, Financial Times 2017). The plumbing can only 
work better, producing resilient market liquidity, if DECs adopt classic repos. That 
would allow legal ownership of bonds used as collateral to be transferred to the 
lender. Legal transfer of title enables short-selling (taking positions on bonds without 
owning them in the first place), re-use/rehypothecation (chains of wholesale funding 																																																								7	These included corporate bond repos with maturity less than a year, easier collateral requirements for 
oney market funds (no longer restricted to AAA securities in repo lending) and less restrictions on 
foreign institutional investors’ collateral policies (FSB 2016). 	
connected by the same collateral) and sale of collateral in case of default (Riles 2012, 
BIS 1999). Furthermore, better protection for lenders requires the adoption of daily 
mark-to-market valuation of collateral, ensuring that lenders can recover the entire 
value of their loan if forced to sell collateral. The challenge, AFME(2017) warned, is 
that Chinese pledged repos bear little resemblance to a classic repo because there is 
no title transfer (See Table 1). A bank or fund using a repo cannot engage in market-
making, re-use repo to get funding, cover short position, or swap securities. The 
outright segment may be distinctive, but the lack of collateral valuation mechanisms 
also affects creditor protection.  
 
Put differently, the Chinese repo markets bear the hallmarks of financial fragility: 
over-the-counter, concentrated on the overnight segment, enabling growing levels of 
leverage, with collateral dominated by government and policy bank securities. 
However, this is not fragility in the Minskyan sense of orienting the shadow banker 
towards the daily market value of collateral. Chinese repo markets do not engender 
Lehman-style fragilities that rendered US shadow banking systemic to global finance 
because repo collateral practices do not validate business models predicated on daily 
volatility in the price of collateral securities.   
 
Table	1	Chinese	vs	classic	(Western)	repo	
 Classic repo Chinese 
pledged 
repo 
Chinese 
outright repo 
Chinese 
SSE repo 
Legal transfer of 
title to collateral 
Yes No Yes No 
Collateral valuation 
 1. Mark to market Yes  No  No No 
2. Haircuts Yes No No Yes 
2. Margin calls Yes (daily) No No No 
 
 
It is important to note that finance lobbies with an interest in promoting securities 
markets successfully deployed similar arguments about classic repos in high-income 
countries.  Although it is common to retrace the history of shadow banking as a story 
of regulatory arbitrage and idiosyncrasies of the US financial system, a more careful 
look points to changing macroeconomic paradigms alongside the financial 
globalisation. The 1990s saw the emergence of a repo market liberalization project as 
the Keynesian state made way for central bank independence and market financing of 
government debt.  To attract international investors, G7 countries adopted the 
institutional blueprint of the US government bond market, including a classic repo 
designed according to the preferences of globalised finance. Investors required repo 
markets free of regulatory intervention, the narrative went, if they were to enter local 
securities markets. A liberalized repo market could be used to fund securities 
portfolios, to borrow temporarily securities for shorting and to enter and exit 
securities markets easily, lubricating liquidity and lowering funding costs. The policy 
engineering of liquid bond markets has been, since the 1980s, a shadow-banking 
project of liberalising repo markets (Gabor 2016).  
 
Paradoxically, the Bundesbank was one of the few G7 central banks (alongside Bank 
of England) to resist loud calls from its large banks and the Ministry of Finance that it 
relax its grip on the repo market in the early 1990s. It invoked concerns with financial 
stability and monetary policy effectiveness. But the threat that France, a more eager 
liberaliser, might dominate the Euroarea capital markets proved impossible to resist. 
By 1997, it abolished repo rules (that the FSB would later use as template to regulate 
shadow banking). Ten years after, Bundesbank was quietly powering the G7 project 
to roll out free repo markets (shadow banking) to DEC countries. This approach only 
changed when the repo runs triggered by Lehman’s collapse forced central banks to 
recognize that repo markets fed leverage, asset bubbles and financial instability in 
securities markets- based financial systems (Tarullo 2015). 
 
What is at stake in building ‘resilient’ market-based finance? 
 
The more careful supporters of financial globalisation would find little to worry in the 
FSB’s new agenda. After all, the FSB work on shadow banking has produced in short 
period of time, unusual for global financial reforms, a comprehensive regulatory 
regime. The FSB introduced rules for increasing transparency and skin-in-the game 
for securitization, it tightened regulations for the most systemic shadow banks (money 
market funds), and for the first time it also outlined rules on the use of repos for 
funding securities portfolios, reducing its propensity to feed leverage and asset 
bubbles. While these rules are not legally binding for FSB members, the combination 
of moral suasion and peer pressure has thus far proved effective. Indeed, the FSB’s 
reform agenda, Mark Carney suggested in 20178, meant that shadow banking was no 
longer a systemic danger to global financial stability. The age of asset management 
may be upon us, but the FSB made it safer, more resilient than the age of global 
banking that led the world into the global financial crisis (see Christophers 2013). 
 
Such optimism is unwarranted for three reasons. First, it is now well-documented that 
FSB repo collateral rules have been watered down significantly. From an approach 
that targeted any institution using repos, the most recent FSB proposals only target 
those between non-banks that use non-government bond collateral. That reduces the 
scope of collateral rules to around 20% of the global repo market universe (Gabor 
2016). Equally important, the FSB abandoned the push to treat large asset managers 
as too big to fail global institutions, that would have generated stricter oversight and 
capital requirements. Blackrock, the world largest asset manager, with assets under 
management of USD 4.5 trillion, twice the size of the largest global bank, wrote to the 
FSB in September 2016 to congratulate it for rethinking its position, the result of 
years of intense lobbying (Bloomberg 20169). The Trump administration in the US is 
likely to put another nail in the coffin of repo regulation. The first Treasury (2017) 
report on recalibrating financial regulation identified a freer repo market as a key 
priority for an administration worried about market liquidity.  
 
DEC countries would be unwise to rely on FSB rules to contain the fragilities of 
market-based finance. For DEC regulators reluctant to liberalise repo markets, the 
Committee on the Global Financial System (2017) report makes grim reading.  First, 																																																								
8 https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/jul/03/financial-crisis-mark-carney-fsb-bank-of-england-
g20 
9 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-09-26/blackrock-vanguard-hail-regulators-shift-
from-too-big-to-fail 
the report echoes the FSB (2015, 2016) and AFISMA (2017) view that repo markets 
are liquidity-enhancing rather than systemic shadow markets feeding leverage and 
fragility. One annex however, notes that a more volatile market environment, one that 
US tightening of monetary policy could easily trigger, will put significant pressure on 
asset managers active in repo markets. This admits that the age of asset management 
will be riddled with shadow banking fragilities.   
  
Second, the re-engineering of shadow banking comes with pressures for DEC 
countries to import the institutional structures for producing liquid securities markets 
from the high-income countries, entangling money and bond markets. While this is 
narrated as a modernisation of arcane/archaic money markets, it imposes a structure 
for generating liquidity that is known to be highly fragile. The classic repo amplifies 
liquidity shocks, it triggers fire sales in securities markets and wholesale funding runs 
(FSB 2012, 2013, Carney 2014). Repo markets, the Lehman Brothers collapse 
showed, are resilient to the extent that the central bank extends its mandate to become 
a market-maker of last resort, arresting the collapse in collateral prices (Mehrling 
2012, Gabor 2016). Put differently, shadow banking as market-based finance relies on 
implicit, and in several countries (eg. Great Britain) explicit, state guarantees in the 
form of direct central bank interventions in securities markets. Paradoxically, China’s 
repo markets would become a source of systemic risk if the PBOC follows through 
with the recommendations of the FSB and finance lobbies to adopt ‘modern’ repo 
markets and open them up to foreign investors. Collateral fragility is not yet a mark of 
systemic risk in Chinese (shadow) banking because the existing legal regime does not 
allow lenders to sell or mark collateral to market. These ‘archaic’ rules may hurt 
individual investors but do protect the financial system.   
 
Third, few traces remain today of the gung-ho international financial capitalism 
pushing for capital account liberalization in the 1990s (Bhagwati 1998). It has been 
replaced by new arguments that DECs need to solve the ‘missing markets’ problem 
by transforming shadow banking into deep, resilient securities markets. Supported by 
sound macroeconomic policy, market-based finance will allow DEC countries to 
harness the benefits of financial globalisation. But the perils remain. The entry of 
foreign investors in local bond markets is a mixed blessing: it may improve liquidity, 
but often in a pro-cyclical fashion. The IFIs new position on how to address these pro-
cyclical forces, that capital controls are warranted once countries have strengthened 
their macroeconomic policies, is also misleading (Gabor 2012). Large capital inflows 
bring structural change, financialising currency markets (currency trading driven by 
financial rather than real economy motives, see McCauley and Scatigna 2011) and 
interbank money markets (interbank liquidity determined by banks’ market activities 
rather then lending to the real economy). With financialised currency and interbank 
money markets, DEC countries often had no choice when faced with currency market 
pressures, including speculative attacks, then to hike interest rates, potentially 
harming ‘real’ economic activity (IMF, 2013: 18, also Gabor 2014). Furthermore, 
Kaltenbrunner and Painceira (2017) convincingly articulate the Minskyan paradox 
faced by central banks in DEC countries: credibility and predictability in monetary 
and exchange rate policies breeds instability by encouraging speculative, one-sided 
bets. More currency volatility reduces the build-up of speculative positions, but also 
acts as a deterrent to the entry of foreign investors, as China discovered recently. In 
sum, the project of building local currency bond markets attractive to foreign asset 
managers will run into serious policy dilemmas, dilemmas that regulators in high-
income countries have confronted but failed to solve for some time now. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The shadow banking reform agenda in DEC countries has undergone fundamental 
changes. It started as a project of understanding, regulating – and for DEC regulators 
protecting – alternative sources of credit that are socially useful given the credit 
rationing exercised by the formal banking sector. However, it has morphed into a 
project of transforming DEC financial systems into market-based finance, of policy 
engineering the production and wholesale funding of tradable securities. In practice, 
the project resuscitates pre-crisis ideas about the benefits of financial globalization, 
and threatens the policy space for managing DEC countries’ integration in global 
finance, space won through long struggles to normalize capital controls in the face of 
large and volatile capital flows.  
 
The paper raises several questions for future research. It is important to map out how 
DEC countries are engaging with the ‘shadow banking into market-based finance’ 
agenda. While India and China, two of the largest, have so far retained a cautious 
approach, particularly towards liberalizing systemic shadow funding markets, the 
rapid changes in their financial systems may generate additional pressures to fully 
embrace the ‘missing markets’ approach outlined by high-income countries. For 
instance, in April 2016, China’s Yu’E Bao (owned by Alibaba) became the largest 
shadow bank (money-market fund) in the world, overtaking the US’s largest fund, JP 
Morgan Government Money Market Fund. What policies are available for countries 
faced with rapidly growing domestic institutional investors? How can these be 
harnessed into a stabilizing force? And what are the implications for a research 
agenda in international political economy that takes seriously Blyth and Matthijs 
(2017) plea for re-engaging with the global macroeconomy? 
 
Furthermore, future research could examine critically the longer-term implications of 
the policies to engineer market-based finance at the intersection with climate and 
poverty reduction strategies. While this paper examined the efforts to deepen DEC 
government and private bond markets, the turn to market-based finance can be viewed 
through longer historical lenses. It prepares the terrain for generating new asset 
classes in DEC countries. For instance, the Climate Bonds Initiative, supported by the 
global bank HSBC, promises to mobilise the global investor community for market-
based climate action, allowing investors to finance low-carbon, climate-resilient 
infrastructure via ‘climate-aligned’ bonds. In 2015, China was the lead issuer of green 
bonds, a ‘zero to hero’ story applauded by foreign investors 10 . What are the 
implications for our understanding of the financialisation of the environment (see 
Keucheyan this issue)? Furthermore, international development interventions to fight 
poverty have been re-framed through financial inclusion (see Mader this issue). This 
new development paradigm promises to solve poverty with big data. A new alliance 
of DEC countries, international financial organisations, ‘philanthropic investment 
firms’ and fintech companies celebrate the power of technology to simultaneously 
achieve positive returns, philantrophy and human development (Gabor and Brooks 
2016, also Mader 2016). Fintech companies promise to create, collect and commodify 																																																								
10 https://www.ft.com/content/84ac893a-028e-11e7-aa5b-6bb07f5c8e12 
behavioral data from the poor’s digital footprints, under the motto ‘all data is credit 
data’. In thus advancing the risk frontier towards the world’s poor, the new digital 
financial inclusion agenda creates new opportunities for market-based finance 
(poverty bonds and the securitisation of digital loans) and the financialisation of 
development. 
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